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Introducing  something  new: The Trade Restrictiveness  Index
measures  the  restrictiveness  of  a system  of  trade  protection.  This
measure is both simple  and consistent  with economic  theory.
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Anderson and Neary introduce a new measure,  These theoretical derivations permit a major
the Trade Rt,strictiveness Index, to measure the  synthesis of the theory of protection and sugge-t
restrictiveness of a system of trade protection.  how the results of computable general equilib-
They propose an altemative to the commonly  rium models might be presented to make them
used ad hoc indexes of trade restrictiveness, such  internationally and intertemporally comparable.
as the trade-weighted average tariff. That mea-  But in most cases such a model is not available
sure has no welfare-theoretic basis and can be  and, even if it were, it would not be sufficiently
highly misleading, in practice.  For example, the  disaggregated to deal with a complicated system
complete exclusion of trade in a commodity  of trade protection.
would usually lower the index, because its trade  So the authors present some empirical short-
weight would fall to zero.  cuts that can be adopted for estimating changes in
Anderson and Neary show that their proposed  the Index. Chief among these is the assumption
index is soundly based in standard welfare eco-  that the goods under consideration are separable
nomics. When trade is restricted by tariffs only, the  from others in an appropriate general-equilibrium
Trade Restrictiveness  Index equals the uniformn  sense. This can provide a rigorous foundation for a
tariff, which would be equivalent to the existing  forn of partial-equilibrium  analysis (the consider-
system of tariffs in the sense of yielding the same  ation of a subset of markets in an economy). They
level of aggregate welfare.  also show how the 'rade Restrictiveness  Index can
But tariffs have declined in importance in  be adapted to allow for different forms of rent
recent years as a means of restricting trade, so  sharing and for a country's ability to influence its
the measure must also be able to take account of  terns of trade.
quantitative restrictions on trade. Where quotas  Applying these empirical methods to exports
are the only form of restriction, this is easy: the  of textiles and apparel from Hong Kong to the
Index equals the equiproportionate reduction in  United States, the authors find that the protective
permitted import volumes that is welfare-  sysiem becomes more restrictive for both
equivalent to the initial structure of quotas.  countries over the seven years considered (1982-
When both quotas and tariffs arc present, the  88). Increased trade restrictiveness does not
Index can be defined as the uniform tariff factor  necessarily mean that quotas have been tight-
(one plus the uniform tariff) and uniform import  ened. When there is economic growth, constant
reduction factor which would yield the same  or even rising import quotas might still amount
level of welfare as the initial system of trade  to a tightening of protection.
restrictions.  Results based on the trade-weighted average
The authors show how this can be formu-  of "tariff equivalents" (the gaps between Hong
lated, noting that if a single good is subject to  Kong and U.S. prices) diverge significantly from
both a binding quota and a tariff, it should be  those of the Trade Restrictiveness Index. The
viewed as quota-constrained - the tariff serves  two measures have opposite implications for the
mereiy to ensure that some of the rents accrue to  change in trade restrictiveness for two-thirds of
the importing country.  the observations.
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I  Introduction
How  should  we  measure  trade  restrictiveness?  This  important  question
arises  repeatedly  in  international  trade  negotiations,  in  discussions  of
World  Bank  loan  conditionality  and  in  the  new  literature  relating  openness  to
growth.  A distinct  but  related  question  is:  how  costly  is  trade
restrictiveness?  Both  questions  have  simple  answers  in  the  case  where  a
single  good  is  subject  to  an  import  tariff:  the  height  of  the  tariff  is  an
unambiguous  measure  of  trade  restrictiveness  and  its  relative  welfare  cost
equals  the  "Harberger  triangle,"  the  area  under  the  compensated  import  demand
curve,  mormalised  by  gross  domestic  product. (The  questions  are  distinct,
since  the  same  tariff  could  produce  a  different  relative  welfare  cost  in  two
different  economies  if  their  elasticity  of  import  demand  or  share  of  trade  in
GOP  varied;  conversely,  the  same  relative  welfare  cost  could  be  produced  by
two  different  tariffs.) With  more  than  one  tariff,  the  welfare  cost  measure
is  a  well-known  matrix  expression.I  In  contrast,  the  literature  contains  no
theoretically  based  measure  of  trade  restrictiveness  in  the  realistic  case
where  trade  in  many  commodities  is  restricted,  analogous  to  the  height  of  the
tariff  in  the  simple  case.  For  want  of  a  better  alternative,  analysts  have
usually  calculated  trade-weighted  average  tariffs  or  (in  the  case  of  quotas)
average  tariff  equivalents.  However,  these  have  no  welfare  foundation  and
suffer  from  the  problem  that  highly  restricted  imports  which  'should'  get  a
high  weight  in  the  index  have  low  levels  of  imports  and  so  get  a  low  weight.
Hence  there  is  currently  no  good  answer  to  the  question  of  how  to  measure
trade  restrictiveness.  This  paper  aims  to  provide  one.
See  equation  (2.3)  below.
IIn  measuring  the  welfare  cost  of  Protection  there  is  one  well-known  case
where  the  simplicity  of  the  one-dimensional  analysis  is  Preserved  no  matter
how  many  tariffs  are  in  place:  this  is  where  tariff  cuts  are  uniform  or
e;%:jiproportionate  across  all  goods.  In  this  paper.  we  propose  a  solution  to
the  aggregation  or  index  number  problem  of  measuring  trade  restrictivenss  in
the  presence  of  many  tariffs  which  builds  on  this  insight. Essentially,  it
asks  'What  uniform  tariff  structure  is  equivalent  (in  a  welfare  sense)  to  a
given  tariff  structure?" 2 The  answer  is  a scalar  measure  of  the  overall
protective  impact  of  an  arbitrary  tariff  structure. Moreover,  the
proportionate  rate  of  change  of  our  index  turns  out  to  be  equal  to  the
standard  measure  of  the  cost  of  tariff  protection,  normalised  by  what  we  call
the  "shadow  value  of  distorted  trade." By  contrast.  most  existing  studies
norealise  the  cost  of  protection  by  some  other  deflator,  frequently  the  level
of  GOP.  Our  measure  has  the  advantage  of  normalising  in  a  manner  which  is
intuitively  appealing  and  which  can  be  given  a  rigorous  welfare
interpretation.  Its  most  important  advantage  is  practical:  since  our
-;sasure  is  a  uniform  tariff  equivalent  index,  it  permits  comparisons  of  the
restrictiveness  of  trade  policy  across  countries  and  across  time  periods.
A further  advantage  of  our  approach  is  that  it  can  be  extended  to
la,corporate  quantitative  trade  restrictions  as  well  as  tariffs. Such
restrictions  are  increasingly  important  in  world  trade  but  the  theory  of
protection  has  been  extended  to  take  account  of  them  only  relatively
recently.3 From  a  theoretical  point  of  view,  our  Paper  therefore  serves  to
link  this  recent  literature  with  the  work  on  scalar  distance  function'
2  Corden  (1966)  is  an  early  paper  which  considers  the  possibility  of
calculating  the  'uniform  tariff  equivalent  of  a non-uniform  tariff
structure. Note  that  our  analysis  does  not  imply  that  uniform  tariffs  are
necessarily  welfare  superior  to  a  non-uniform  tariff  structure  with  the
same  average  tariff  level. For  contrasting  views  on  the  optimality  of
uniform  tariff  structures,  see  Fukushima  and  Hatta  (1987)  and  Stern  (1990);
and also  Lopez  and  Panagariya  (1991).
3  See Corden  and  ralvey  (1985),  Dixit  (1986),  Falvey  (1988),  Neary  (1988,
1989) and  Anderson  and  Neary  (1992).
2measures  of  efficiency  in  production  or  consumption  by  Oebreu  (1951),  Deaton
(1979),  Diewert  (1985)  and  Anderson  and  Neary  (1990).  From a  practical
point  of  view,  we  a'lso  argue  that  our  measure  can  be  made  operational  and  in
Sections  VI  and  VII  we  illustrate  its  use  with  an  application  to  measuring
the  restrictiveness  of  U.S.  Volt;ntary  Export  Restraints  on  textile  imports
from  Hong  Kong.  The  results  are  dramatic. In  our  application,  in  four  out
of  six  years,  the  trade  restrictiveness  index  has  opposite  implications  to
those  of  the  commonly-used  (and  theoretically  inferior)  average  tariff
equivalent.
II The  Trade  Restrictiveness  Index  with  Tariffs  Only
In  this  section  we  begin  by  reviewing  the  standard  theory  of  the  cost  of
protection  in  an  economy  where  tariffs  are  the  only  form  of  trade
restriction.  We  then  show  how  this  can  be  related  to  our  measure,  the
'Trade  Restrictiveness  Index'  or  TRI.4
We  consider  a  competitive  small  open  economy,  producing  tradeable  goods
only, 5 in  which  specific  tariffs  t  drive  a  wedge  between  the  domestic  prices
(n) and  the  world  prices  (0e)  of  goods  which  are  indexed  by  i.  In  vector
notation,  n  =  ntS  +  t  6  The  behaviour  of  the  economy  is  most  conveniently
sumearised  in terms  of the trade  expenditure  function.  which  equals  the
difference  between  the  value  of  consumption  (given  by  a  standard  expenditure
function)  and  production  (given  by  a  GNP  function): 7
4
In  Anderson  and  Neary  (1990),  we  used  the  term  "coefficient  of  trade
utilisation"  to  reflect  the  relationship  between  our  index  and  the
'coefficient  of  resource  utilisation*  of  Debreu  (1951).
5Non-traded  goods  can  be  subsumed  into  the  background  so  long  as  their
prices  are  determined  competitively.
6We adopt  the  convention  that  a  is  the  vector  of  all  goods  prices  (or,  from
Section  III  onwards,  of  the  prices  of  all  goods  not  subject  to  quotas).
The  numeraire  good  can  then  be  thought  of  as  a  good  with  a  zero  tariff;  and
if  good  i  is  exported  then  t  is  an  export  subsidy.
7The properties  of  these  functions  are  set  out  in  Dixit  and  Norman  (1980).
3(2.1)  E(i,u)  a  e(n,u)  - g(X).
Here  u  is  the  utility  of  the  aggregate  household  sector  (so  that  issues  of
distribution  are  ignored)  and  the  economy's  t-hnokLgy  and  factor  endowments
are  subsumed  in  the  g(.)  function. The  function  E  has  the  standard
properties  of  an  expenditure  function:  it  is  concave  in  n  and,  by  Shephard's
Lemma,  its  derivatives  with  respect  to  X  are  the  economy's  net  (i.e.,  import)
demand  functions. We  assume  that  all  tariff  revenue  is  redistributed
costlessly  to  the  household  sector,  so  that  in  equilibrium  the  trade
expenditure  function  must  equal  the  sum  of  tariff  revenue  and  the  trade
surplus  p,  if  any  (assumed  throughout  to  be  exogenous):
(2.2)  E(n,u)  =  t'm +
Here  a  prime  (')  denotes  a  transpose  and  o  is  the  vector  of  import  demand
functions  for  imports  subject  to  tariffs,  equal  to  E (x,u).  Differentiating
(2.2)  leads  to  the  standard  result  for  the  welfare  effect  of  a  small  change
in  tariffs:
(2.3)  (1-t'xI)E  du  =  t'mcdt.
The  left-hand  side  is  the  change  in  utility,  converted  to  numeraire  units  by
the  tern  E  (the  inverse  of  the  marginal  utility  of  income)  and  multiplied  by
U
(1-t'x  ),  which  is  the  inverse  of  the  'tariff  multiplier"  or  "shadow  price  of
foreign  exchange." 8 Following  standard  convention,  we  shall  assume  that
this  term  is  positive. This  leaves  the  right-hand  side  as  the  standard
cost-of-tariff-protection  measure. As  is  well-known,  this  depends  on  all
the  terms  in  the  matrix  of  price  derivatives  of  the  import  demand  functions  aX
(which  equals  E.) and  it  cannot  be  signed  unambiguously  in  general. The
one  exception  is  the  case  of  a  uniform  change  in  tariffs:  dt  = tda.  where  du
is  a  positive  or  negative  scalar. In  this  case  we  can  call  a  the  average
See  Neary  (1988.  1989)  for  further  discussion.
4level  of  tariffs  and  the  weifare  effect  of  a  change  in  a  equals  t'lmt,  which
is  a  scalar  quadratic  form  in  a negative  definite  matrix  and  so  is  negative.
We  now  want  to  show  how  any  tariff  siructure  can  be  made  equivalent  (in
welfare  terms)  to  a  proportionate  tariff  structure. To  do  so,  it  is
convenient  to  switch  from  the  vector  of  specific  tariffs,  t,  to  the  vector  of
tariff  factors.  0.  which  equal  the  rroportional  mark-ups  over  world  prices:
n  = nX  ;  or  in  matrix  notation:  X  = nf0.  (ON  is  a  diagonal  matrix  with
world  prices  on  the  principal  diagonal.) for  later  use,  the  relationship
between  the  levels  of  and  changes  in  t  and  * are  as follows:
(2.4)  t  =  nH(O-J)  and  dt  =  nIdO
where  ".J  denotes  a  vector  of  ones.  Now,  rewrite  the  equilibrium  condition
(2.2)  in  terms  of *, and  define  a  new  function,  the  Ba,ance of  rrade  Function.
as  a  measure  of  the  extent  to  which  the  economy  diverges  trom  balanced  trade
equilibrium:
(2.5)  B(O,u;)  a  E(I1s,u)  - (0-l)'nsh  -e
Here  the  parameter  I  represents  all  the  exogenous  variables  other  than  trade
policy  (such  as  the  levels  of  factor  endowments,  world  prices,  the  trade
surplus  P.  tastes,  etc.). We  do  not  need  to  assume  that  these  remain
constant,  although  changes  in  them  raise  some  specific  issues  in  the  presence
of  quotas,  which  we  postpone  until  Section  V.
We  now  wish  to  compare  the  restrictiveness  of  trade  policy  in  two
periods,  denoted  "0"  and  '1"  respectively.  The  economy  must  be  in
equilibrium  in  both  periods,  so:
(2.6)  B(o°  u 0;t m)  2  B(tOtu;  )  S  0.
9  The  trade  expenditure  function  is  concave  in  prices  and  so  the  matrix  of
price  derivatives  must  be  negative  semi-definite.  Provided  we  assume  that
there  is  some  substitutability  between  the  numeraire  good  and  the  goods
subject  to  tariffs,  we  can  go further  and  assert  that  this  matrix  must  be
negative  definite.
5We  define  the  Trade  Restrictiveness,Index  as  the  factor  of  proportionality  4
by  which  period-I  tariff  factors  must  be  scaled  up  or  down  in  order  to  reach
period-O  utility: 1 0
(2.7)  a( 1.u0;7 0)  C  Ca  B(Ao&  u0;y 0)  0].
If  trade  policy  does  not  change  between  the  two  periods  (00=01),  A  equals
one.  If  free  trade  prevails  i. period  l.  so  that  *  1 is  a  vector  of  ones,  A
equals  (one  plus)  the  uniform  tariff  rate  which  would  have  yielded  the  same
level  of  welfare  as  the  initial  non-uniform  vector  of  tariff  factors  00  In
other  cases,  A  eouals  (one  plus)  the  uniform  tariff  surcharge  rate  which
copepsrates  for  the  non-uniform  change  in  the  tariff  structure  from  00  to  t.
As  the  period-i  tariff  factor  vector  0l  varies  from  00  towards  free  trade,  A
rises  above  one.  Thus  a rise  in  a  means  that  trade  policy  has  become  less
restrictive.  11
Figure  1,  drawn  in  tariff  factor  space,  illustrates  the  interpretation
of  A.  Assuming  that  only  two  goods  are  subject  to  tariffs.  point  F,  with
coordinates  (1,1).  corresponds  to  free  trade  and  point  A,  with  coordinates
(OX,  o0),  is  an  arbitrary  initial  protected  equilibrium. To  compare  these
two  points,  we  draw  through  A  an  iso-welfare  locus,  which  represents  those
combinations  of  tariff  factors  on  the  two  goods  which  yield  the  same  level  of
welfare  as  A  and  also  preserve  balance  of  payments  equilibrium.  2  The  ray
10  Since  this  asks  how  the new"  tariff  factors  must  be  scaled  to  attain  the
old'  level  of  welfare,  it  is  a  compensating  variation  type  of  welfare
measure. Me  assume  that  a  is  single-valued.  This  requires  that  the
denominator  of  equation  (2.9)  (or,  more  generally,  that  of  equation  (4.10)
in  Section  IV)  does  not  change  sign.  We  assume  that  this  is  the  case
throughout  the  theoretical  discussion,  and  consider  Possible  exceptions  in
the  empirical  application  in  Section  VII.
This  slight  potential  source  of  confu".;pn  Iouid  be  avoided  by  the  use  of  an
equivalent  variation  measure A  B(A0  ,u  ;I  )  =  0].  However,  this  is
not  necessarily  defined  for  all  parameter  values  and,  even  when  it  is,  it
is  not  as  easily  implementable  as  (2.7).  unless  the  analyst  has  access  to
a  computable  general  equilibrium  model.
12  The  properties  of  this  locus  may  be  established  by  expanding  the  right-hand
side  of  (2.3)  and  they  are  considered  in  detail  in  Neary  (1989). It  is
shown  there  that,  provided  all  goods  are  substitutes,  the  points  of
6from  the  origin  through  F  meets  this  locus  at  point  C,  and  so  the  Trade
Restrictiveness  Index  equals  the  ratio  of  OC  to  OF.  Keeping  A  as  the
reference  equilibrium,  successive  moves  of  the  new  equilibrium  towards  free
trade  lead  to  rises  in  A.
Both  the  interpretation  and  the  potential  applicability  of  the
Trade  Restrictiveness  7rJex  are  enhanced  by  considerinsig  wmall  changes  in
the  period-I  tariff  factor  vector  0.  Totally  differentiating  the  equation
which  implicitly  defines  A  in  (2.7),  holding  uo  and  y°  constant,  yields:
(2.8)  8'4dA +  ABed0  0.
This  may be solved  for  the  proportional  change in  4.  denoted by &:
B'dO  t.m dt
(2.9)  A  - =  _ ___  =  E-
B O  t'Ugf 
Each  of  these  three  alternative  express5ons  throws  light  on  the
interpretation  of  changes  in  A.  From  (2.5),  B,  gives  the  vector  of
transfers  needed  to  compensate  for  increases  in  tariffs,  or  minus  the
marginal  cost  of  tariffs. It  equals:
(2.10)  B  -(frj)'f'mnfl  =  -tV'mfln.
The  term  B'#  in  the  denominator of  (2.9)  may therefore  be  interpreted  as
(minus)  the  total  welfare  cost  of  the  initial  tariff  structure,  which  we  call
the  "shadow  value  of  distorted  trade." As  for  the  numerator.it  is  the  cost
of  an  arbitrary  change  in  tariffs,  as  derived  in  (2.3).  Thus  the
proportional  change  in  A ,  for  a  small  change  from  the  initial  equilibrium,
equals  the  conventional  measure  of  the  cost  of  tariff  protection,  normalised
by  the  shadow  value  of  distorted  trade. The  final  expression  in  (2.9)
suggests  how  this  might be operationalised:  it  equals  a  weighted  average  of
inflection  of  the  locus,  6  and  H,  must  lie  to  the  north-east  of  F  and  must
lie  on either  side  o  the  45-degree  line  OF.  A  sufficient  condition  for
the  locus  to  enclose  a  convex set  is  that  the  trade  expenditure  function
be quadratic  in  prices.
7the  changes  in  tariff  factors,  where  the  weights,  a.,  (which  are  not
necessarily  Positive)  are  the  contribution  of  each  protected  good  to  the
total  shadow  value  of  distorted  trade:
(2.11)  B  ____
We  will  return  to  the  issue  of  operationalising  the  Trade  Restrictiveness
Index  in  Section  VI.  First,  we  turn  to  consider  quantitative  trade
restrictions.
III  The  Trade  Restrictiveness  Index  with  Quotas  Only
When  we  turn  to  quantitative  restrictions  on  trade,  it  is  necessary  to
disaggregate  the  net  import  vector. Henceforward.  we  let  q  represent  the
permitted  trade  volumes  in  the  quota-restricted  product  group,  with  foreign
prices  p*  and  domestic  prices  p.  For  the  unrestricted  group,  we  use  the
same  notation  as  in  Section  II:  a  is  the  trade  volume  and  n  is  the  domestic
price  vector.  equal  (until  Section  IV)  to  world  prices  n*.  Of  course,  the
domestic prices  p of  the  quota-constrained  goods  are  not  exogenous  but  must
adjust  to  ensure  that  the  quota  levels  (which  we  assume  are  always  binding)
equal  domestic  excess  demands.
To  derive  the  cost  of  protection  in  this  case,  it  is  convenient  to
consider  an  alternative  expression  for  the  trade  expenditure  function  defined
in  (2.1):13
(3.1)  E(p,n,u)  a  Min  (p'q+x'm  :  U(q.m)-u).
q,m
Here  U  is  a  "eade  trade  utility  function  definedE  over  the  trade  vector
(q.m).  This  function  is  appropriate  when  prices  (P,x)  are  given  so  that  the
trade  vector  is  endogenous.  When  quotas  are  in  force  so  that  q  is  fixed,  it
13 The results  which follow  draw on Anderson and Neary (1992)  and  are  related
to  results  in  the  theory  of  consumer  rationing;  see  Neary  and  Roberts
8is  more  convenient  to  characterise  the  aggregate  consumer  as  choosing
expenditure  on  the  tariff-restricted  product  group  only.  This  leads  to  the
distorted  trade  expenditure  function:
(3.2)  t(q,n,u)  a  min  (z'm  '  U(q.m)=u). m
The  relationship  between  the  two  functions  is  straightforward:
(3.3)  t(q,n,u)  =  Max {E(p.n,u)-p'q}.
p
Since  E  is  concave  in  P,  the  first-order  conditions  from  (3.3)  give  the
prices  which  equate  demand  E (p,n,u)  with  supply  q.  The  first  derivative p
properties  of  t  are  therefore:
(3.4)  n(q,n,u)  = E  tp(q.n,u),n,u]  =
(3.5)  t  (q,n,u)  =  -p(q,n,u).
q
The  first  property  follows  from  Shephard's  Lemma:  the  price  derivatives  of
the  distorted  trade  expenditure  function  equal  the  import  demand  functions
for  the  unconstrained  goods  (with  the  tilde  over  the  "i'  indicating  that
these  demands  are  conditional  on  given  levels  of  the  quotas  rather  than  on
given  levels  of  p).  The  second  property,  (3.5),  equates  the  quantity
derivatives  of  the  distorted  trade  expenditure  function  to  the  economy's
marginal  willingness  to  pay  for,  or  the  'virtual  prices"  of,  the
quota-constrained  goods.  (See  Neary  and  Roberts  (1980).)  '  is  concave  in
n and  convex  in  q,  by  its  minimum  in  i and  maximum  in  P  properties.  We
assume,  with  only  mild  loss  of  generality,  that  the  matrix  of  quantity
derivatives  of  the  virtual  price unctions  p  (equal  to  -E  or  E  1)  is q  qq  pp
negative  definite.
Equilibrium  is  now  easily  described  using  the  distorted  trade
expenditure  function:
(3.6)  E(q.x,u)  + p'q  =  (p-p:)'q  +
The  left-hand  side  equals  net  domestic  expenditure  on  all  goods  (from  the
9definition  of  t  in  (3.2));  and  in  equilibrium  this  must  equal  the  sum  of
total  quota  rents  and  the  trade  surplus,  given  by  the  right-hand  side.  (In
the  next  section  we  will  allow  for  the  possibility  that  not  all  quota  rents
accrue  to  domestic  residents.)  Differentiating  (3.6)  yields  a  simple
expression  for  the  welfare  cost  of  changes  in  quota  levels: 14
(3.7)  fdu  =  o-px)'dq.
u
As  before,  it  is  desirable  to  obtain  a  scalar  measure  of  the  severity  of
an  arbitrary  system  of  quotas. To  do  this,  we  proceed  as  in  the  last
section. We  first  define  a  balance  of  trade  function,  equal  to  the
deviation  of  equation  (3.6)  from  equilibrium:
(3.8)  8(q,u;l)  *  t(q.x,u)  + p'q  - (p-ps)'q  -
The  Trade  Restrictiveness  Index  for  quotas  can  now  be  defined  as  the
proportionate  change  in  period  I  quotas  required  to  reach  period  0  utility:
(3.9)  A(q',u°;y°)  C,&  :  B(q 1/A,u 0;yo)  = 0].
This  is  illustrated  in  Figure  2,  where point  A represents  an arbitrary
initial  equilibrium  and point  F a new  equilibrium  (which  may,  but  need  not
be,  identified  with  free  trade). The  value  of  A  is  the  distance  OF/OC,
where point  C lies  on  the  same  iso-utility  locus  as  A.
Proportionate  changes in  a can once again  be identified  with  the  welfare
effect  of  arbitrary  quota changes normalised by the  total  welfare  cost  of  the
initial  quota  vector:
B'dq  (p-px)'dq
(3.10)  A  =  =  £  a  q ,
Bq  (p-p*)'q  J  J
q
where:
14 This  result  is  derived  and discussed in  Cordon and Falvey  (198S) and  -eary
(1988).
10q
(3.11)  8  - p-ps  and  °  =  J  J q  B'q
q
The  interpretation  is  identical  to  that  of  equation  (2.9),  with  the
additional  convenience  that  the  denominator  of  (3.10),  (p-ps)'q,  equals  the
actual  value  of  total  quota  rents  at  the  initial  equilibrium.  Once  again,
an  increase  in  A.  starting  from  the  reference  equilibrium  u°,  implies  that
trade  policy  has  become  less  restrictive.
IV The  Trade  Restrictiveness  Index  with  Tariffs  and  Quotas
We  now  wish  to  consider  the  realistic  case  where  trade  is  restricted  by
both  tariffs  and  quotas. As  before,  q  and  m represent  the  trade  voluses  in
the  quota-  and  tariff-restricted  groups,  respectively.  I  In  addi on,  we
assume  that  a fraction  w of  quota  rents  accrues  to  foreigners.  6  This  is
consistent  with  awarding  the  fraction  X  of  ali  quota  licenses  to  foreigners,
or  with  voluntary  esport  restraints  (VER's)  where  foreigners  return  a
fraction  (1-w)  of  the  rents  to  domestic  residents,  or  with  a  tariff  on  quota-
controlled  imports  at  the  specific  rate  (1-0)(P-P*)  17  We  also  assume  that
the  rent  share is  uniform  across  commodities  and  that  it  is  fixed  by a
process which is  independent of  q and t  i8 With these  assumptions,  the
equilibrium  condition  therefore  becomes:
is  Some  of  the  items  in  the  q group may  be subject  to  both  tariffs  and quotas.
Such goods should  be counted as  falling  in  the  quota-restricted  group,
since  the  quota  constraints  bind  at  the  margin. The  effect  of  the  tariff
is  then  to  increase  the  share  of  rents  on  these  goods  which  accrues  to  the
domestic  economy. For  an  illustration  of  this,  see  Section  VII  below.
16  me  continue  to  assume  that  all  tariff  revenue  t'm  is  retained  at  home  and
accrues  to  the  private  sector,  an  assu  ption  which  can  easily  be  relaxed.
17  Alternatively,  this  is  the  result  of  an  ad  valoree  tariff  on  the
quota-constrained  good  at  a  rate  equal  to  (1-w)  times  (p-p*)/p. In
either  of  these  cases,  the  tariff  must  change  when  p  changes  if  w is  to
remain constant.  We  assume  in  this  section  that  this  change occurs,  so
that  quota  reform  does not  alter  the  rent  share.  The alternative  case,
whbre  the  tariff  is  fixed  and  w adJusts,  is  considered  in  Section  VII.
la  Relaxation  of  these  assumptions is  discussed  in  Anderson and Neary (192).
11(4.1)  t(q,g,u)  +  p'q  =  t'M  +  (l-c)(P-p*)'q  +
The  right-hand  side  of  this  differs  from  that  of  (3.7)  in  two  respects:
consuoLrs  now  receive  tariff  revenue  as  well  as  quota  rents;  and  they  receive
only  a fraction  of  the  latter,  with  w(p-p*)'q  accruing  to  foreigners.
To  derive  the  welfare  effects  of  different  policy  changes,  we  now  need
to  differentiate  equation  (4.1).  To  do  so,  it  is  convenient  once  again  to
introduce  the  balance  of  trade  function,  defined  as  the  deviation  of  (4.1)
from  equilibrium,  and  with  tariff  factors  X  replacing  tariff  levels  t:
(4.2)  O(q.4.u;y)  *  E(q,jlO,u)  +  p'q  - (4-J)'fm  - (1-w)(p-pX)'q  - .
Differentiating  this  yields:
(4.3)  8  du  =  -B'd - B'dq.
where:
(4.4)  a  =  (1-t'  +wq P  )t
u  I  U
(4.5)  -8'  =  (t'  P-)*C.q'Pn)fl
(4.6)  -B'  t'`  -wq'p  +(i-.)(p-px)'.
q  q  q
The  term  B  equals  the  inverse  of  the  marginal  utility  of  income, ,
u  U
multiplied  by  the  shadow  price  of  foreign  exchange,  which  differs  from  unity
to  the  extent  that  there  are  income  effects  on  the  demands  for  tariff-  or
quota-constrained  goods.  As  always,  we  will  assume  that  the  distortions  are
not  so  severe  as  to  render  this  term  negative19  and  shall  not  consider  it
further. As  for  the  coefficients  -B.  and  -eq.  they  measure  the  margiAal  cost
of  tariffs  and  the  shadow  prices  of  quotas  respectively.  Clearly,  the
simultaneous  presence  of  tariffs  and  quotas  complicates  the  expressions
considerably  relative  to  the  special  cases  considered  in  Sections  II  and
19  If  they  were,  then  there  would  be  a  welfare  gain  from  disposing  of  some  of
the  economy's  factor  endowment,  and  so  the  policy  reform  issue  would  be
trivial.
12III.20  However.  in  principle  they  are  still  computable,  an issue  to  which  we
will  return  in  Section  VI.
We are  now  ready  to  define  the  Trade  Restrictiveness  Index  for  this
general  case.  We  wish  to have  a  single  scalar  measure  of the  severity  of a
given  protective  structure.  To  do  this,  it  is  necessary  as in  Section  II to
switch  from  specific  tariffs  to tariff  factors.  Moreover,  it  is  convenient
to  go further  and  to  work  with  the  inverse  of  the tariff  factors.  This
allows  us  to  define  "liberalisation  factors"  l,  which  equal  quota  levels  for
quota-constrained  goods  and  the  inverse  of  tariff  factors  for  tariff-
constrained  goods:
q  for  quota-constrained  goods
(4.7)  x  =  I
1/0.  for  tariff-constrained  goods
We  may  now  define  the  full  Trade  Restrictiveness  Index  in  terms  of  these
liberalisation  factors:
(4.8)  (x  1,u0;y 0)  [A :  B(XI/Au0 °;y 0) =  0].
The  value  of A has  the  interpretation  of  the  equal  proportionate  tightening
of  all  quota  levels  and  raising  of  all  tariff  factors  which  would  be
equivalent  in  welfare  terms  to  a given  initial  protective  structure  with  any
arbitrary  pattern  of  quotas  and  tariffs.  As  before,  a rise  in A corresponds
to  a move  towards  a new  equilibrium  with  trade  policy  X  1 which  is  less
restrictive  relative  to  the  initial  equilibrium  with  trade  policy  X
Differentiating  the  index  gives  the  effects  on  the  measure  of  a small  change
in  trade  policy  relative  to  the  initial  equilibrium:
(4.9)  =  E  a Xi,
or,  writing  out  the  weights  in full  for  quotas  and  tariffs  (the  difference  in
sign  between  the  two  reflecting  the fact  that  trade  restrictiveness  rises  with
20  See  Anderson  and  Neary  (1992)  for  further  discussion.
13louer  quota  levels  but  with  higher  tariff  factors): 21
Bq
(4.10)  ^  =  B._i ;  B'q- 8'  B'q  - B8  i
j  q  q 
Since  all  the  terms  in  this  expression  can  be  calculated  from  (4.5)  and
(4.6),  we  have  thus  derived  a  scalar  operational  seasure  of  the  overall
change  in  restrictiveness  as  a result  of  any  change  in  trade  policy. Once
again,  the  denominator  of  the  expression  for  Z is  the  shadow  value  of
distorted  trade,  this  time  equal  to  the  sum of  each  quota  times  its  shadow
price  and  each  tariff  factor  times  its  marginal  cost.
Y  Changes  in  the  Restrictiveness  of  Quota  Policy  in  the  Presence  of  Growth
As  already  noted,  our  measure  of  trade  restrictiveness  does  not  require
that  exogenous  variables  other  than  trade  policy  (as  sumearised  in  the  y
vector)  remain  constant.  22 However,  if  trade  is  restricted  in  part  by
quotas,  we  need  to  be  careful  in  interpreting  the  phrase  'change  in  trade
policy^  when  other  exogenous  variables  are  also  changing. For  example,  if
real  growth  takes  place  in  the  economy,  maintaining  constant  quota  levels
amounts  to  an  increased  restrictiveness  of  trade  policy.3  It  is  still
possible  to  calculate  A from  equation  (4.8),  of  course,  but  it  must  be
interpreted  as  an  uncoapensated  index,  measuring  the  restrictiveness  of  trade
policy  relative  to  a  benchmark  equilibrium  with  fixed  quotas. By  contrast,
for  many  purposes  it  may  be  more  appropriate  to  calculate  a compensated
index,  which  corrects  for  changes  in  exogenous  variables  by  taking  an
alternative  benchmark  equilibrium  in  which  the  domestic  prices  of  the
21  Henceforward,  wherever  the  context  permits  it  without  ambiguity,  we  use
subscripts  -i"  and  'j'  to  refer  to  individual  tariff  factors  and  quotas
respectively.  Thus  Bi  gives  the  derivative  of  B  with  respect  to i  ,  etc.
22  It  is  straightforward  to  adapt  our  methods  to  develop  a  measure  of  the
welfare  effects  of  changes  in y.  but  this  is  not  our  concern.
23  Growth  may  also  alter  the  welfare  cost  of  tariff  protection,  but  we  would
not  wish  to  say  that  it  makes  given  tariffs  more  restrictive.
14quota-constrained  goods  are  kept  constant. (These  considerations  are
familiar  to  policy-eakers,  who  frequently  build  in  automatic  adjustments  to
quotas  in  line  with  economic  growth).
To  formalise  these  ideas,  we  write  q°  for  the  vector  of  quotas  which
would  compensate  for  a  change  in  an  exogenous  variable  in  the  sense  of
maintaining  domestic  prices  p  constant. This  quota  vector  is  implicitly
defined  by  the  following:
(5.1)  p(q°,n u°)  =  p(q0,r0,u 0,°y),
where  °  is  the  initial  value  and  y1  the  new  value  of  the  exogenous  variable,
assumed  henceforward  to  be  a  scalar. In  equation  (5.1),  ao  is  the  level  of
utility  which  would  be  attained  in  equilibrium  if  trade  policy  were  to  remain
constant  in  this  sense:
(5.2)  13(q',°,iu  ,  I)  0.
We  may  now  define  the  compensated  TRI,  Q,  as  tne  equiproportionate  change  in
trade  policy  which  would  return  the  economy,  not  to  the  initial  utility  level
u  °  but  to  the  hypothetical  'equirestrictive  quota  policy level  u`:
(5.3)  A  a  [A  :  B(q 1/&AO',u0 0.1)  =  O]
This  is  identical  to  the  definition  of  the  uncompensated  TRI,  (4.8),  except
that  it  is  evaluated  at  the  compensated  utility  level  u°  rather  than  uo  and
at  the  new  exogenous  variables  y1  rather  than  °.  Changes  in  A  must  then
take  account  of  changes  in  u°  and  11 as  well  as  of  changes  in  trade  policy:
8uu  I
^  Bu~~~U  B  o_  _  _  _  _  _  -
(5.4)  a  =  ^  +  u  +
B'q  - el  B'q  - B 
q  q  -
where  Q is  simply  E  ai  i, as  in  (4.9)  (although  evaluated  at  a  different
point).
A  particularly  simple  form  of  (5.4)  results  if  tastes  are  homothetic
and  growth  is  'balanced'  in  the  sense  that  all  sectors  grow  at  the  same  rate
15at  constant  prices. We  will  refer  to  this  combination  of  assumptions  as
"neutral  growth";  note  that  I  can  then  be  interpreted  as  the  rate  of  growth.
It  can  now  be  shown  (details  are  given  in  the  Appendix)  that  the  balance  of
trade  function  is  homogeneous  of  degree  one  in  (q,u,y):24
(5.5)  8'q  +  B  u  +  B  =  B. q  UI
This  implies  that  the  solution  to  (5.1)  and  (5.2)  takes  the  particularly
simple  form:
ao  ~I  0  oI 
(5.6)  u  -= u  and  q  -q.
Hence  it  follows  that:
(5 .7)  4u  0  =
In  words,  "coapensating"  for  neutral  growth  requires  that  all  quota  levels,
and  the  growth-compensated  reference  utility  level  itself,  rise  at  exactly
the  rate  of  growth. Substituting  from  (5.5)  and  (5.7)  into  (5.4)  yields
finally:
Blq q
(5.8)  =  q
B'q  - B'O
Thus,  compensating  for  the  increased  restrictiveness  of  quotas  as  a  result  of
growth  at  given  quota  levels  requires  that  the  standard  TRI  be  reduced  by  the
rate  of  growth  times  the  contribution  of  quota  restrictions  to  the  shadow
value  of  distorted  trade.  The  reason  why  we  must  subtract  a  term  in  the
growth  rate  of  real  income  is  that,  if  trade  policy  parameters  are  given,
then  growth  renders  the  quota  regime  sore  restrictive.
VI Operationalising  the  Trade  Restrictiveness  Index
24  It  is  convenient  to  assume  henceforward  that  the  trade  balance  l  is
initially  zero.  Alternatively,  equation  (A.4)  in  the  Appendix  implies
that  (5.8)  also  holds  if l  rises  at  the  rate  of  economic  growth.
16When  we  turn  to  consider  how  the  TRI  nay  be  operationalised,  we  have  a
clear  choice. On  the  one  hand,  the  analyst  may  already  have  access  to  a
fully-fledged  computable  general  equilibrium  (CGE)  model  of  the  economy,  in
which  case  the  level  of  the  TRI  provides  a  convenient  method  of  summarising
the  model's  results,  permitting  consistent  cross-country  and  intertemporal
comparisons.  On  the  other  hand,  if  a  CGE  is  unavailable,  the  change  in  the
TRI  may  still  be  calculated  provided  a  number  of  analytic  short  cuts  are
taken. In  principle,  the  use  of  a  CGE  model  is  the  ideal  Procedure.
However,  in  practice,  CGE  models  are  typically  based  on  a relatively  small
number  of  goods  with  inappropriate  aggregation  of  the  fine  structure  of  trade
restrictions.  By  contrast,  the  payoff  to  the  local  approximation  approach
is  that  we  can  devote  more  attention  to  the  detailed  commodity-by-commodity
structure  of  protection.  In  this  section,  we  outline  the  simplifications
which  were  made  in  our  own  application  of  the  TRI  to  U.S.-Hong  Kong  trade  in
textiles,  described  in  Section  VII.
A.  Separability  Assumptions
The  general  theoretical  framework  has  assumed  that  the  analysis  is  to  be
carried  out  at  the  level  of  the  economy  as  a  whole.  However,  in  many
applications  the  analyst  may  be  interested  in  only  a  few  markets. In  such
circumstances  it  is  natural  to  define  a  partial  Trade  Restrictiveness  Index,
defined  over  the  trade  policy  instruments  applicable  to  the  markets  of
interest  only.  For  example,  if  only  quota-constrained  markets  are  being
considered,  the  partial  index  is,  instead  of  (4.8):
(6.1)  &( 0 ,q  ,u°;y 0 )  a  [A  8(q1/A, 0°  u;y 0)  *  0].
In  addition,  it  is  very  convenient  in  this  case  to  assume  that  the  goods  to
be  considered  are  separable  from  others. In  our  Hong  Kong  applications,  all
the  goods  examined  were  subJect  to  binding  U.S.  import  quotas,  so
25 In  spirit,  our  approach  resembles  the  'local'  general  equilibrium  analysis
of  Desrdorff  and  Stern  (1986).
17separability  can  be  viewed  as  a  restriction  on  the  cross  relationships
between  quota-constrained  and  other  goods.  This  amounts  to  imposing  a
specific  structure  on  the  trade  expenditure  function:
(6.2)  E(p,n,u) =  C  M(p,u),Vn.u),u].
The  implications  of  this  specification  for  the  derivatives  of  the  balance  of
trade  function  have  been  examined  in  Anderson  and  Neary  (1992). In
particular,  the  expression  for  the  shadow  price  of  quotas,  equation  (4.6),
simplifies  in  this  case  to:
(6.3)  -8'  =  -_Tp'  - E  P'  +  (l-0)(p-ps)'.
q 
Comparing  this  with  (4.6),  we  see  that  separability  has  allowed  us  to
simplify  two  complicated  matrix  expressions.  The  term  t'eq  (measuring  the
change  in  tariff  revenue  arising  from  a  quota  relaxation)  is  replaced  by  the
much  simpler  term  -w',  where  T is  the  import-weighted  average  ad  valor&e
tariff  on  the  m  goods;  and  the  term  -wq'p (measuring  the  change  in  rents
q
accruing  to  foreigners  arising  from  the  effect  of  a  quota  relaxation  on  home
prices)  is  replaced  by  the  term  -(kfc)p',  where  E  is  the  aggregate  elasticity
of  demand  for  quota-constrained  goods.
3.  Tariffs  as  a  Rent-Sharing  Nechanism
A  key  aspect  of  operationalising  the  TRI  is  obtaining  estimates  of  the
rent  share  parameter  w.  Hong  Kong  exports  of  textiles  and  apparel  to  the
U.S.  are  subJect  to  binding  VER's  under  the  Multifibre  Arrangement  (WA).
However,  not  all  of  the  rents  accrue  to  Hong  Kong  exporters  since  the  U.S.
levies  an  ad  valores  tariff  of  around  20.  26  This  implies  that  the  rent
share  o  is  not  fixed  but  varies  with  q  and  also  that  it  varies  across
comodities. Naturally,  this  alters  the  expression  for  the  shadow  price  of
quotas. To  see how,  we  assume  that  international  arbitrage  equates  U.S.
26 Since the  quotas always bind,  the  goods are quota-constrained  throughout
and the  tariff  serves  solely  as a rent-sharing  mechanism.
18import  prices  p  to  Hong  Kong  export  prices  p*,  plus  the  price  of  a  Hong  Kong
export  license  p.  grossed  up  by  the  U.S.  import  tariff  r  (which  is  the  same
for  all  goods):27
(6.4)  p  (1+trq)(ps  + p).
The  rents  accruing  to  the  U.S.  equal  the  total  rents (p-p*)'q  less  Hong
Kong  lic;ense  revenue  p'q.  Using  (6.4)  to  simplify,  this  becomes:
(6.5)  (p-px)'q  _  p'q  =  q  pq.
l+'r
q
Substituting  into  the  balance  of  trade  function  (4.2)  and  simplifying  gives:
(6.6)  B(q.,Ou;y) a  ti(q.  MO.u) +  1r  p  Iq  - t  I  -
q
Differentiating  and  simplifying  yields.  instead  of  (4.6),  the  following
expression  for  the  shadow  price  of  quotas  fros  the  U.S.  point  of  vie*:
I  T
(6.7)  -8,  =  t  - -q' q  P-.  p
q  q  I4  q  +'
q  q
Finally,  imposing  the  separability  restrictions  discussed  in  Section  VI.A
gives  the  following  simple  expression:
(6.8)  -( 8US)  =  .p  +  [tq  - "I
q  I  ,q  q  i
Since  the  U.S.  tariff  on  Hong  Kong  exports  of  textiles  and  apparel  (r  )  of
q
about  20*  exceeds  the  U.S.  average  tariff  (r)  of  about  4%.  the  shadow  price
of  quotas  is  positive  for  the  U.S.
C.  Harket  Power
In  this  application  we  assume  plausibly  that  the  U.S.  is  a  small  open
economy:  it  faces  constant  marginal  costs  of  Hong  Kong textiles  and apparel
so pa  is  fixed  in  the  relevant  range of  exports.  However, the  same  cannot
27  ge  follow  other  researchers  in  assuming that  the  license  price  is  included
in  the  FOB  price  and  so  is  subject  to  the  tariff. Estimates  based  on  the
alternative  assumption. p  (= r q)p*  +  p.  are available  on request.
1,be  assumed  of  Hong  Kong,  since  it  faces  downward-sloping  demand  curves  in  the
U.S.  Strictly  speaking,  this  should  be taken  into  account  in  our
theoretical  derivation.  28 However,  a  simpler  approach  is  to  view  the  terms
of  trade  loss  to  the  U.S.  of  a  quota  change,  measured  in  (6.8)  by
-(li/(l.,  )]P',  as  equalling  the  gain  to  Hong  Kong.  The  other  two  terms  in
q
the  expression  for  the  shadow  price  of  quotas  are  easily  modified. Since
Hong  Kong  does  not  impose  tariffs  on  other  goods,  the  term  X  is  zero  and  the
first  term  vanishes;  and  since  Hong  Kong  exporters  receive  the  full  license
price,  the  third  term  is  simply  p.  The  shadow  price  of  quotas  from  Hong
Kong's  perspective  is  therefore:
(6.9)  ((BHK),  =  - 1 - I  PI  +  p.
q  UT~  £
q
A  final  complication  in  the  case  where  a  country  has  monopoly  power  in
trade  is  that  the  adjustment  to  quota  policy  to  compensate  for  econosic
growth  should  be  modified. AS  we saw  in  Section  U,  when  tastes  are
homothetic  and  growth  is  balanced,  a  growth-compensated  quota  policy  in  a
small  open  economy  is  one  whereby  all  quotas  rise  at  the  rate  of growth.
Uhen  prices  are  variable.  we  would  expect  the  required  changes  in  quota
levls to  be  smaller  in  absolute  value,  since  some  of  the  welfare  gain  from
growth  is  offset  by  a  worsening  of  the  terms  of  trade,  necessitating  a
snaller  growth  in  quotas  to  maintain  the  same  level  of  trade  restrictiveness.
However,  attempts  to  take  account  of  this  in  the  empirical  application  have
so  far  proved  unsuccessful,  so  we  have  simply  imposed  the  value  of  minus  one
in  the  results  reported  below  29
VII An  Application:  U.S.  Textile  Imports  from Hong  Kong
We  turn  finally  to  our  empirical  application,  which  calculates  a  partial
28  See  Neary  (1989)  and  Anderson  and  Neary  (1992),  Section  II.4,  for  further
details.
29 This  amounts to  applying  equation  (5.8)  ignoring  the  term B¢#
20index  for  the  restrictiveness  of  U.S.  quota  policy  on  imports  from  Hong  Kong
under  the  MFA.  Our  sample  consists  of  exports  of  twenty  seven  categories  of
textiles  and  apparel  from  Hong  Kong  to  the  U.S.  over  the  six  years  1983  to
1988.  The  choice  of  coverage  was  determined  by  the  availability  of  data  on
Hong  Kong  export  quota  licence  prices,  p;  for  these  we  used  data  collected  by
Carl  Hamilton  supplemented  by  World  Bank  estimates. Data  on  export  prices
and  quantities  and  U.S.  tariffs  in  each  category  were  extracted  from  the
World  Bank's  MFF  data  base;  and  changes  in  real  income  for  the  two  countries
were  measured  by  the  growth  rates  in  real  disposable  income.
Estimates  of  the  price  elasticity  of  U.S.  demand  for  Hong  Kong  imports
were  not  available. If  we  assume  that  imports  from  Hong  Kong  are  perfect
substitutes  for  other  textile  imports, 30 the  elasticity  we  require,  c,  equals
the  elasticity  of  U.S.  demand  for  all  textile  imports.  E.  divided  by  the  Hong
Kong  import  share.  The  latter  fluctuated  around  .15  during  the  period
considered;  the  exact  values  are  given  in  Table  1.  We  present  results  for
three  values  of  c,  -0.5,  -1  and  -2.  with  the  unitary  case  being  the
literature's  consensus.  31
The  results  are  presented  in  Table  2.  For  each  year  and  each  value  of
w  we  give  the  changes  in  the  uncompensated  and  compensated  TRI's  from  the
U.S.  and  Hong  Kong  points  of  view  (using  the  formulae  in  equations  (6.8)  and
(6.9)).32 These  are  compared  with  the  changes  in  the  average  tariff
equivalent,  calculated  in  the  conventional  manner  as  a trade-weighted  average
of  the  implicit  tariffs,  pi.  (Table  I  gives  the  levels  of this  measure.)
30  Strictly  speaking,  this  is  inconsistent  with  our  assumption  of  general
equilibrium  separability.  Since  the  results  turn  out  to  be  relatively
insensitive  to  the  elasticity  value  assumed,  this  is  not  perhaps  a
critical  point.
31 See  Trela  and  Whalley  (1990).
32 The  formulae  for  S are  for  local  changes whereas the  data  refer  to  discrete
intervals.  To allow  for  this,  the  changes given  are  Divisia  indices,
calculated  using  the  arithmetic  averages of  the  parameters  in  two
successive  periods.
21Consider  first  the  results  from  the  U.S.  point  of  view.  Our  measure
suggests  that  over  the  period  there  was  a  marked  increase  in  the
protectiveness  of  the  trade  regime. Although  the  uncompensated  index  rose
slightly  in  all  years  except  1984,  it  did  so  by  less  than  the  growth  rate  of
real  income,  so  that  the  value  of  a  fell  in  five  of  the  six  Years,  with  a
cumulative  fall  (representing  an  effective  tightening  of  the  quotas)  of  14.9%.
By  contrast,  the  traditional  measure,  the  average  tariff  equivalent,
fluctuated  widely  over  the  same  period,  with  an  average  annual  rate  of
increase  of  about  6.3X.  While  this  has  the  same  qualitative  implication  (an
increased  restrictiveness  of  the  quota  regime)  as  our  estimates  of  changes  in
the  true  measure,  its  variability  from  year  to  year  is  highly  implausible.
Moreover,  in  four  out  of  six  years.  the  average  tariff  equivalent  has  the
opposite  isplication  for  the  change  in  trade  restrictiveness  as  our  index.
This  dramatic  finding,  similar  to  that  in  Anderson  (1991),  reveals  the
serious  practical  inadequacy  of  the  standard  measure  of  trade
restrictiveness.  Note  that  our  estimates  are  not  at  all  sensitive  to
different  assumptions about  the  elasticity  of  demand,  s.  Although,  from
(6.9),  all  shadow  prices  rise  as  the  elasticity  falls,  this  tends  to  affeci
all  categories  uniformly  in  both  the  numerator  and  denominator  of  Z and  so
does not  significantly  alter  the  estimated  change in  A.
Turning to  the  results  from  the  Hong  Kong  point  of  view,  they  reveal
further  interesting  properties  of  the  TRI  approach.  'he  estimates  are  much
more  sensitive  to  the  value  of  the  elasticity  than  were  those  for  the  U.S.
Noreover,  in  four  years  when E is  at  its  low  value,  most or  all  of  the
estimated  quota  shadow  prices  are  negative,  with  the  result  that  the  shadow
value  of  distorted  trade,  -B'q,  is  itself  negative.  This  implies  that  a q
fall  in  A is  welfare-improving;  i.e.,  that  in  those cases tiong  Kong's
monopoly  power in  trade  is  so great  that  the  actual  quota  levels  are  above
22their  optimal  value.  32 If  we  confine  attention  to  the  central  case  (E 
-1),  & fell  in  five  of  the  six  years,  implying  that  Hong  Kong  as  well  as  the
U.S.  has  been  losing  from  the  direction  of  policy. Once  again,  the
implications  of  our  measure  are  very  different  from  those  of  the  crude  change
in  the  average  tariff  equivalent.
VIII Conclusions  and  Suggestions  for  Further  Research
In  this  paper,  we  have  presented  a  new  approach  to  measuring  the
restrictiveness  of  a  protective  structure. The  measure  we  ProPose,  the
Trade  Restrictiveness  Index,  has  a firm  welfare-theoretic  basis  yet  can
be  implemented  fairly  readily. In  the  case  of  tariffs,  the  TRI  equals  the
uniform  tariff  which  is  equivalent  to  (in  the  sense  of  yielding  the  same
level  of  aggregate  welfare  as)  a  given  tariff  structure. We  have  shown  how
this  approach  can  be  extended  to  allow  for  quotas  as  well  as  tariffs  and  to
encompass  partial  rent-sharing,  which  arises,  for  example,  from  voluntary
export  restraints.  Implementing  the  TRI  requires  more  data  than  calculation
of  standard  measures  of  protection  such  as  the  trade-weighted  average  tariff
equivalent.  However,  the  latter  is  quite  unsatisfactory  as  a  summary
measure  of  trade  restrictiveness.  Mereover,  our  empirical  application  in
Section  VII  has  shown  that,  with  appropriate  additional  assumptions,  the  TRI
can  be  readily  implesented  and  that  it  yields  very  different  conclusions  from
the  standard  approach.
In  further  work  we  hope  to  carry  out  more  espirical  applications  of  the
TRI to  demonstrate its  usefulness  in  both  International  and intertemporal
comparisons.  Further  theoretical  refinement  would also  be desirable  to
improve the  treatment  of  neutral  quota policy  in  the  presence of  real  income
growth and to  incorporate  terms of  trade  changes.  Finally,  the  TRI can in
32  Trela  and Uhalley  (1990)  also  find  that  a  reversion  to free  trade  hurts
Hong  Kong. because of  its  large  terms of  trade  loss,  although  their
results  are  not  fully  comparable with  ours.
23principle  be  extended  to  represent  the  uniform  level  of  trade  restrictiveness
which  would  be  welfare-equivalent  to  a  given  set  of  domestic  as  well  as  trade
distortions.  This  would  allow  a  quantitative  assessment  within  a  consistent
welfare-theoretic  framework  of  many  of  the  issaes  concerning  the  trade
effects  of  domestic  policies  which  have  been  raised  in  negotiations  on  US-EC
and  US-Mexico  trade.
24APPENDIX:  NEUTRAL  GROWTH  AND  THE  BALANCE  OF  TRAOE  FUNCTION
If  tastes  are  homothetic,  the  household  expenditure  function  e(p,R,u)  may
be  written,  without.  loss  of  generality,  as  ue(p,n). Similarly,  if  growth
can  be  represented  by  a  scalar  parameter  y  and  if  it  is  "balanced'  (in  the
sense  that  all  sectors  grow  at  the  same  rate  when  prices  are  given),  then  the
GNP  function  g(p,n,y)  can  be  written,  without  loss  of  generality,  as l(P,)
Combining  these  assumptions,  the  trade  expenditure  function  in  the  absence  of
quota  distortions  becomes:
(A.1)  E(p,a,u,)  a  ue(p,n)  - i(P,)
This  is  clearly  homogeneous  of  degree  one  in  (u,).
The  next  step  ia  to  consider  the  distorted  trade  expenditure  function:
(A.2)  t(q,,u.y) - Hax  (E(p,a,u,'y)-p'q).
This  will  be  homogeneous  of  degree  one  in  (q,u,y)  provided  that  the  domestic
price  function  p(q,n,u,)  is  homogeneous  of  degree  zero  in  (q.u,y). out
this  must  be  the  case,  since  the  first-order  condition  from  (A.2)  is:
(A.3)  q  =  ue  (p.n) - yi  (p,n).
Since  the  left-hand  side  is  homogeneous  of  degree  one  in  q and  the  right-hand
side  is  homogeneous  of  degree  one  in  (u.y),  it  follows  that  p(q,x,u.j).  which
is  defined  implicitly  by  (A.3),  must  be  homogeneous  of  degree  zero  in
(q.u,y). Hence  the  distorted  trade  expenditure  function  t(q9x,u9,V)  must  be
homogeneous  of  degree  one  in  (q.u,y),  as  required.
Finally,  we must ask what this  impies  for  the  balance  of  trade  function:
(A.4)  B(q,x,u,y)  *  t(qpx9u,y)  *  p(q,x.,u,l)q  - (x-n)1(q.x,u,)
- (l-.)[p(q.w.u.j)-ps]'q  - P.
From  Shephard's Leoma, s(q,ff,u,j)  equals  t¢  q,x,u,)  and so  is  homogeneous  of
degree one in  (q,u,).  It  follows  that  each individual  term on the
right-hand  side  of  (A.4),  and hence the  expression  as  a whole,  is  homogeneous
of  degree one in  (q,u,g,p).
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27Year  Hong  Kong  Share  Average  Tariff
of US  Imports  of  Equivalent
Textiles  and  Apparel
1982  0.194  0.126
1983  0.200  0.309
1984  0.162  0.285
1985  0.143  0.192
1986  0.144  0.294
1987  0.131  0.332
1988  0.132  0.193
Table  1:  Hong  Kong  Share  in  U.S.  Imports  and  Average  Tariff  Equivalents  of
U.S.  Voluntary  Export  Restraints,  1982-88
28U.S. Point  of  View  Hong  Kong  Point  of View  Change  in
Average  Tariff
I  Chance  in  I  Change  in  I  Change  in  Change  in  I Change  in  2 Change  in  Equivalent
tlncompensated  Real  Income Compensated  Unctopensated  Real  Income  Compensated
TRI  Tit  11  TI1
lpsilon  -0.S0
1983t  2.6  3.9  -1.3  4.1  5.4  -1.3  84.4
1984t  -4.1  6.8  -10.9  -3.7  10.6  -14.3  -8.1
1985'  1.9  3.2  -1.3  0.5  2.5  -2.0  -39.2
1986  6.5  2.8  3.7  0.0  8.6  -8.6  42.2
1987  1.1  2.9  -1.8  -8.0  12.7  -20.7  12.0
1983'  0.8  4.5  -3.7  -0.9  6.4  -7.3  -53.0
Epsilos  -1.00
1983  2.8  3.9  -1.1  2.4  5.4  -3.0  84.4
1984  -4.2  6.8  -11.0  -5.4  10.6  -16.0  -8.1
198S  1.7  3.2  -1.5  3.9  2.5  1.4  -39.2
1936  6.6  2.8  3.8  3.9  8.6  -4.1  42.2
1961  1.0  2.9  -1.9  0.9  12.7  -11.3  12.0
1911  0.9  4.5  -3.6  -0.1  6.4  -6.5  -53.0
Epsilo:  -2.00
1983  3.0  3.9  -0.9  -2.7  5.4  -8.1  84.4
1934  -4.3  6.3  -11.1  -4.6  10.6  -15.2  -8.1
i19  1.6  3.2  -1.6  3.0  2.5  0.5  -39.2
1936  6.1  2.8  3.9  5.1  8.6  -3.5  42.2
1917  0.9  2.9  -2.0  1.1  12.7  -11.6  12.0
1918  1.1  4.5  -3.4  0.1  6.4  -6.3  -53.0
t  Denotes  a  negative  shadow  value  of  distorted  trade  fros  Hong  Ion;g  poit  of view
Table  2: Changes  in  the Trade  lestrictivesess  lodes:
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